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Abstract—As adoption of e-health solutions advances, new
computing paradigms – such as cloud computing – bring the
potential to improve efficiency in managing medical health records
and help reduce costs. However, these opportunities introduce
new security risks which can not be ignored. Based on our
experience with deploying part of the Swedish electronic health
records management system in an infrastructure cloud, we make
an overview of major requirements that must be considered when
migrating e-health systems to the cloud. Furthermore, we describe
in-depth a new attack vector inherent to cloud deployments
and present a novel data confidentiality and integrity protection
mechanism for infrastructure clouds. This contribution aims to
encourage exchange of best practices and lessons learned in
migrating public e-health systems to the cloud.
Index Terms—e-Health, Security; Cloud Computing; EHR Pro-
tection; Storage Protection
I. INTRODUCTION
Visions of an electronic healthcare system are more than
twenty years old. Researchers aimed for a paperless medical
system where patients and doctors are able to book appoint-
ments via the Internet, create electronic prescriptions and store
their medical history in a central database, easily accessible
from anyone with appropriate access rights.
During these years, there has been a steady increase in
research focus and funding aiming to modernize existing
healthcare systems and provide reliable and cost effective e-
health services. Both private organizations, such as Microsoft,
Google and IBM, and public administration bodies have taken
steps towards e-health. For example, president of the United
States B. Obama, approved $38 billion to digitize the American
health care and believes that at the end of 2014 the nation’s
health records will be fully computerized. In addition, the
Australian government invested $20.3 million in “telehealth”
projects, Tasmania committed $1.8 million in order to update
the information systems responsible for four of its public
hospitals, while Germany has introduced the electronic health
card [1] – a challenging mission in which all insured Germans
received a smart card with which they can securely commu-
nicate with various healthcare stakeholders (doctors, hospitals,
pharmacies etc) by means of telematics.
Based on the advancements in e-health research and develop-
ment, analysts believe that in the near future the modernization
of existing healthcare systems will lead to a wide adoption
of electronic health records (EHRs) [2]. More precisely, it
is expected that scientists and doctors will collect more data
about the human body and individual patients than they have
done in all of history so far. There is no doubt that are many
barriers to that: besides addressing usability issues, e-health
system vendors need to attract user attention and convince them
that e-health systems are reliable, secure and will have tangible
positive impacts on the day-to-day healthcare experience.
Healthcare has been slow to adopt IT, especially when com-
pared to other sectors like banking where customer information
is also sacrosanct. Among the most important reasons for the
slow adoption of e-health services is the fear of storing sensitive
data online. Without proper security mechanisms to protect
user data from unauthorized access, sensitive information may
leak to interested, unauthorized third parties, such as insurance
companies or potential employers. ”It’s not about being scared
of technology; it’s about the appropriate safeguards,” says
Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center [3].
Despite the relatively slow adoption of IT in the healthcare
industry, the medical community gradually advances towards
wider adoption of electronic healthcare. New computing tech-
nologies, such as cloud computing, fit squarely into this evo-
lution. Cloud based e-health services could bring significant
benefits [4]–[6]. Patients would be able to “carry” their whole
medical history everywhere preventing duplicate tests. Doctors
would have the option to share healthcare data across various
settings and geographies, avoiding delays in treatment and
unnecessary confusion. Cloud computing technologies allow
healthcare organizations to improve services to their customers
– the patients – to share information easier than ever before,
and improve operational efficiency. Finally, cloud computing
can reduce e-health expenses, such as hardware, software,
networking, personnel and licensing fees [6]. However, along
with the improvements in service availability, scalability as well
as operational savings, migration of electronic records system
to fully virtualized environments also introduces additional
security risks.
A. Contribution
Our contribution in this paper is three-fold. First, we describe
“Melior”, an electronic patient records system developed by
Siemens Healthcare and used by several Swedish regional
administrations in order to manage patient data.
Second, we present a list of core security requirements
that must be considered when migrating e-health systems to
an IaaS cloud environment. These security requirements were
derived based on our experience with migrating “Melior” to
a private IaaS cloud. We discuss an important attack vector
characteristic for IaaS clouds, namely the virtual machine (VM)
image management process and propose techniques in order to
provide tighter security when building cloud services.
Finally, we address the problem of weak security guarantees
for data generated by e-health applications in IaaS clouds. We
present a storage protection protocol which improves confiden-
tiality and integrity protection of the medical records in IaaS
clouds, without affecting the data access functionality.
B. Organization
In Section II, we present an electronic patient records system
that is used in a few major Swedish County Councils in order
to manage medical data of patients. In Section III, we analyse
the core set of requirements for a successful migration of an e-
health application to the cloud, while in Section IV we discuss
in depth one of the common security risks related to migration
to the cloud. In Section V, we describe a protocol that ensures
the protection of EHRs in the cloud and in Section VI we
conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Region Ska˚ne is a regional public body in Sweden, providing
and managing public services – including healthcare services
– for a population of approximatively 1.25 million inhabitants.
Healthcare services in the region rely on a large set of in-
formation systems with varying levels of interoperability and
intricate interdependencies. For this case study, we have chosen
an electronic patient records system from Siemens Healthcare
called “Melior”, mainly due to its relatively low number of
dependencies, manageable size and support availability [7].
“Melior” is one of the most widely used medical journalling
systems in Sweden. Its development started in 1990 and it
is now used at 46,6% of the hospitals, with a total of about
80,000 users1. Below, we briefly describe its functionality and
the important characteristics of the system’s environment.
A. Functionality
“Melior” provides functionality necessary for process admin-
istration in public healthcare. In particular, “Melior” supports
patient administration, clinical documentation management and
medical prescriptions management. The output of “Melior”
includes issuing nutrition cards and medical investigation re-
ferrals as well as relevant letters and certificates.
B. Preliminaries
Currently “Melior” is deployed on hardware servers in one
of the data centres located in the region, along with other
healthcare information systems used by the Region Ska˚ne.
Besides the necessary functionality provided by “Melior”, the
essential non-functional requirements are: (i) high availability,
(ii) high reliability, (iii) guaranteed data preservation.
“Melior” operates with medical records that carry important
information with direct effect on the health of the patients in
1Webpage of Siemens Melior:
http://www.nwe.siemens.com/sweden/internet/se/healthcare/it-
losningar/melior/pages/melior.aspx
the region. As a result, the system must be available at all times
and operates under strict requirements specified the service
level agreement (SLA)2 by the administration of Region Ska˚ne.
For example, the SLA with the outsourcing service operations
partner of “Melior” assumes a 99,82% uptime throughout a
year.
C. User patterns
Live “Melior” deployment in Region Ska˚ne has currently
up to 6,000 concurrent users. During daytime the average is
around 5,000 concurrent users and 1,500 users during non-
business hours (i.e 5pm to 7am). It is expected that in 5 years
the deployment will host approximately 8,000 concurrent users
during peak hours (i.e 9am, 2pm and 5pm).
D. Components overview
On a higher level, the current “Melior” deployment in Region
Ska˚ne can be described as a set of services deployed on separate
load-balanced clusters. Figure 1 depicts the client and server
side of the deployment, as well as interactions between them.
The server-side consists of the application layer with a set of
essential “Melior” services accepting client connections and a
data layer containing data storage.
These components will be addressed below.
Fig. 1. Components of “Melior”.
1) “Melior” client: Users interact with “Melior” by means
of a Microsoft Windows-based application that runs on per-
sonal workstations and communicates with the “Melior” core
(described below) through protected network channels. Security
of the communication channels between the “Melior” client
and the rest of the system is provided by the deployment
environment.
2) “Melior” core: Processing and storage of medical
records is performed in the “Melior” core. In a simple deploy-
ment scenario, it represents the interplay of three services: the
front-end service, the back-end service and the data store.
2SLA is an agreement between two or more parties, the customer and
the service provider(s). SLA can be seen as a contract between a customer
and a service provider in which the latter provides some level of assurance
regarding the provided service (e.g availability, liability, security etc.). For more
information about SLAs we refer the reader to [8].
3) External dependencies: In order to support its full func-
tionality, “Melior” is integrated with a range of external ser-
vices, both on the client and on the server side. Integration
with external services on the server side is aggregated in the
integration layer, by application layer or data layer. Integrations
serve to both push and retrieve data relevant for the “Melior”
users and ensures interoperability of the systems used in daily
medical care.
E. Deployment overview
Next, we provide some details about the current deployment
of the components of “Melior” described above.
1) Application services: “Melior” is flexible enough to op-
erate with core services deployed on one or multiple servers,
depending on the SLA requirements. In the current deployment
scenario, multiple instances of the “Melior” core services run
in parallel on different physical servers, in order to satisfy the
availability requirements of the SLA. Similarly, the services are
load-balanced in order to ensure optimal performance under
peak load times.
2) Data storage: “Melior” consist of at least two databases,
one Domain database and one or more unit databases. The
Domain database stores information regarding authorization,
clinics, departments, process and terminology. Unit databases
maintain medical records stored in tables and accessed for both
mutating and non-mutating operations. The data layer is divided
into 4 separate domains with a total of 26 databases holding
approximatively 4 TB of data, typically images and text files.
Three core operation principles are relevant in this deployment:
• All data should be equally available at all times
• No data shall be obsoleted
• No data shall be deleted
Typical operations on the data are: INSERT, UPDATE and
DELETE. However, in the case of the DELETE operation, data
is not actually discarded but rather “hidden” from the user. No
data is permanently stored on the client side; versioning history
is not kept for data maintained in the data store.
III. REQUIREMENTS
There is a number of steps for a successful transition from
traditional architecture to a cloud architecture. In this section,
we highlight some essential steps for moving an e-health system
to the cloud. We use this analysis to guide us in the development
of our cloud environment and we hope that it will provide
essential knowledge to organizations that wish to migrate their
EHR systems to the cloud and minimize project and security
risks by avoiding common pitfalls.
Security: When building cloud services, one of the biggest
areas to focus on is security. The externalized aspect of
outsourcing can make it harder to maintain data integrity and
privacy [9] and organizations should include mechanisms to
mitigate security risks introduced by virtualization. Especially
when they deal with sensitive data, such as EHRs, protection
of stored information comes as a top priority. Therefore, data
security can be seen as the foundation upon which the whole
e-health initiative should be based on. Multiple risks must be
addressed in order for an organization to guarantee the safety
of personal health records. One of the most important aspects
is security of sensitive information. To this end, the deployment
must ensure that all patient data is stored in encrypted form.
Complementary to this, proper key management must ensure
encryption keys are not revealed to malicious users.
Following the migration of e-health systems to the cloud,
users have the option to store, organize, share, and access
sensitive medical information from almost anywhere and any
device, including public computers. Thus, strong authentication
protocols must to be deployed in order to prevent impersonation
of authorized users. In addition, patients are able to make
their medical history partly of fully available to doctors when
needed. Even though the shared information should be provided
in an efficient and timely manner, it is essential to ensure its
privacy. Additionally, users must have full control of the infor-
mation they share, control the access rights and see viewing
history.
Integrity is another aspect of data security relevant in this
context. Considering that information in the EHRs has an
important impact on the individual healthcare process, it is
essential that EHRs are not altered or deleted without proper
authorization.
Availability: One of the key arguments when migrating
an e-health system to a cloud platform is availability. Organi-
zations must thoroughly analyse and understand the impacts
on performance and availability and must take actions in
order to be able to provide resources for the highest possible
load. The risk of systems unavailability in e-health industry
is a major issue since there are many cases where healthcare
providers are unable to operate if their applications and/or
patient’s data are not accessible. Even though cloud services
could experience failures due to software and hardware faults,
network faults or even natural disasters [10] cloud providers
must ensure that services will be available to end users. To do
this, organizations must plan on disaster scenarios in order to
improve the redundancy and reliability of their systems. Thus,
it is necessary to apply known safety best-practices and enable
replication between multiple geographical locations to prevent
data loss in case of disasters.
Scalability: Cloud based e-health systems needs to be
designed in such a way that will take advantage of the rapid
scalability and deployment capabilities that cloud computing
offers. In such environments scalability can be defined as “the
ability of a computing system to grow relatively easily in
response to increased demand” [11]. In other words, relying on
IaaS clouds, e-health services are able to augment on demand
existing resources in order to accommodate sudden increases
in requests, or scale down when the load is low – without
incurring additional capital expenses.
Regulatory Compliance: By storing data in the cloud,
users hand it over to a provider that may have data centres in
different geographical locations, countries or even continents.
However, organizations that work with sensitive data, such
as health records, require complete control over the physical
storage location and data access. As a result, storing sen-
sitive data in the cloud complicates adherence to regulatory
compliance laws, since such data may fall under different
regulations depending on where it is physically stored. If for
example data is moved to a different country, a set of different
regulatory requirements may apply. Thus, prior to storing and
processing data through the cloud, organizations must take into
consideration the legal issues in order to ensure that users are
in legal compliance [12].
Cost: A core benefit of cloud migration is the potential for
cost savings. By migrating an e-health platform to the cloud,
organizations can get powerful functionality in the most cost ef-
fective manner. Cloud migration can help organizations reduce
the need for IT teams to operate and maintain expensive internal
infrastructure, reduce maintenance costs, shed at least some
of their expensive IT infrastructure and shift computing costs
to more manageable operational expenses. Nonetheless, if the
transition is not planned carefully, it can lead to disappointing
results. While a plethora of solutions is available, many of them
are not able to meet the specific needs of an e-health system.
Thus, a cloud solution that will not attain the above mentioned
criteria can have catastrophic results for the migration of an
e-health system to IaaS clouds.
IV. CLOUD-SPECIFIC SECURITY ASPECTS FOR E-HEALTH
SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF VM IMAGE MANAGEMENT
While migrating systems to a cloud infrastructure, certain
security risks characteristic to cloud computing become espe-
cially acute in the case of e-health systems. The reason is the
inherently sensitive information collected, stored and processed
by such systems. In our experience with migration of “Melior”
to an IaaS cloud deployment, improper management of VM
images with installed components and databases can not only
lead to data losses and version compatibility issues, but is also
a potential attack vector. Below we discuss the security risks
introduced by the VM image management process and propose
a set of procedures to mitigate such risks.
A. VM images as an attack vector
VM image management is a relatively new aspect of informa-
tion security management, present in IaaS clouds. Long-term
operation of an IaaS cloud leads to an eventual build-up of
ancillary data produced by the cloud platform, such as logs,
data backups, configuration backups and snapshots of virtual
machine images. While all of the above mentioned data streams
may contain sensitive information and thus require structured
and systematic management, VM images may be instantiated
at an arbitrary point in the future and become part of the
IaaS cloud. From a security point of view, the use of diverse
sources of VM instantiation bloats the security perimeter of the
deployment, potentially allowing creation of VM images with
old, unpatched operating system and application-level software.
On the other hand, the composition of different versions of
operating systems and applications may in itself create new
vulnerabilities not present in individual components. This is
valid in general for IaaS clouds and is aggravated by the
complex architecture of e-health applications. As described
in Section III, such applications usually have much more
stringent requirements with respect to identity management and
data protection than typical cloud-based applications. Consider
the example of “Melior”: deployment of most of the system
components requires that an additional set of ports (beyond the
so-called “well-known ports”) is opened on the virtual servers
hosting some of the servers. In case when each component
(such as front-end, back-end and database server) is deployed
on a separate virtual server, a tendency is to first configure
a “master” VM image with opened additional ports and next
deploy the components on clones of the VM image. However,
this process leads to a situation when even the components
that do not require additional ports (e.g. the database server)
will be deployed in a VM instance with unneeded open ports,
unnecessarily increasing the attack surface.
Early research efforts to address this issue focused on image
management [13] in cloud environments that allow image
sharing and designed mechanisms to create image sources
and verify images prior to instantiation. Later, research in
[14] demonstrated a range of serious vulnerabilities found
in public VM images available in the Amazon Web Service
cloud platform. The suggestions provided by the authors are
organizational measures, automated tools to manage the image
publishing process, regular scanning of the images and im-
provement of the image store. This important building block for
a secure VM image management process must also be applied
in the case of e-health systems and would prevent the problem
described above in the context of “Melior” deployment in an
IaaS cloud.
B. The way forward
Based on the security requirements outlined in collaboration
with Region Ska˚ne as well as current best practices and our
experience with the transfer of “Melior” to a fully virtualized
IaaS cloud, we present the following VM image management
process for cloud-based e-health systems (Fig. 3). We will map
the below process to the steps that were taken in the migration
of “Melior” to an IaaS deployment.
1) Image creation: For e-health system deployments and
other security-critical applications, security of virtual machine
images is one of the cornerstones to ensuring data confiden-
tiality. We propose the following principles for the creation of
tailored VM images for e-health applications:
• Trusted source of the operating system (OS). As an initial
bootstrap step, the OS images are obtained from a valid
source through a protected, authenticated channel. The
integrity of the obtained images is verified by comparing
their hashes with the respective hashes provided by the
OS vendor.
• Thorough hardening of the OS according to organization
policies and best practices. The default configuration of
the OS is modified to e.g. reduce application attack sur-
face, install the target e-health application, enable manda-
tory access policies, exclude redundant remote access
channels, etc.
• Traceability of the VM image creation process. The VM
image creation process is automated and made traceable
and consistent with the applicable security policies. Devi-
ation from the established VM image creation process is
regarded as a security vulnerability and leads to discarding
the created VM image.
When migrating “Melior” to an IaaS cloud, this meant
obtaining the operating system directly from the vendor’s
authenticated web-site using SSL. In addition, the integrity of
the VM image was corroborated with the one presented by the
Fig. 2. VM image management process
vendor. Next, the images were hardened by removing unneces-
sary components and only leaving open the ports required by
the components of “Melior”. One master image was tailored
for each type of components of “Melior”: front-end, back-end
and database server. The types, licence keys and descriptions of
VM images were documented in order to provide traceability.
2) Image and snapshot management: Most of the ancillary
information produced by the cloud platform is created during
the active use of the VM images. In this context, “active
use” starts from the moment when an image was created and
made available for instantiation, to its archival combined with
destruction of all instances created from it. The following
principles are relevant for this stage.
Centralized, traceable and reproducible VM image patch
service and image version control and compatibility testing.
Both security patching and the resulting versioning of VM
images is managed in a centralized manner to prevent version
inconsistencies. Considering the combined complexity of the
operating system and e-health system software stacks and the
rapid changes in the combinations of VM image and e-health
application versions, automated security tests are necessary
when patches are applied to any component in the deployment.
Security services for VM instances. During regular operation,
VM instances may benefit from additional security services.
One example is launch on verified platforms [15], to ensure
that the VM instance runs on a host which has not been com-
promised. Another such example is providing instances with
high quality pool of entropy, which is needed for cryptographic
operations performed on the VM image to confidentiality and
integrity protect the e-health data processed by the instance.
Entropy starvation could lead to both decreased security [16]
and poor performance of the VM instance.
During the prototype migration of “Melior” to an IaaS cloud,
we relied on versioning the VM images in order to clearly trace
the changes to functionality and configuration that have been
made to VM images between any two snapshots.
3) Image archival and destruction: The life cycle of a VM
image ends with its (optional) archival and eventual destruction,
depending on the relevant organizational policies. If VM image
archival is applicable, the archived images used in the e-health
deployment are encrypted and assigned the highest information
sensitivity classification available in the context of the e-health
application. The reason for this is that such images are likely to
contain aggregated traces of medical record information which
could be misused by adversaries.
Destruction of VM images is the final step of the proposed
VM image management process. In a survey of secure data
deletion techniques, the authors provide a taxonomy of secure
data deletion techniques analysed by the target adversary, in-
tegration level, granularity, scope and efficiency [17]. Deletion
of VM image files takes into consideration the above aspects
when choosing the deletion approach. In the context of IaaS
clouds however, e-health system users ensure that the cloud
provider has followed the suitable deletion approach.
Similarly, in the case of “Melior”, special attention must
be paid to protection and when needed guaranteed deletion of
the database VM image. VM images with other components –
the front-end and back-end components – also require careful
deletion when discarded, as they may contain session keys and
cached data that have the potential to affect confidentiality and
integrity of the EHRs.
V. STORAGE PROTECTION
One of the key benefits that cloud based solutions can
provide to the e-health systems is the ability to share infor-
mation, such as EHRs, between different organizations and
information systems that may be located in different countries.
Nevertheless, storing confidential health data in the cloud rises
many security challenges. With personal medical information
in hand, corrupted users are able to commit medical identity
theft by impersonating other users in order to receive goods or
services, potentially wreaking havoc on the victim’s records and
creating liabilities for service providers and increasing costs for
everyone. Thus, healthcare organizations must provide strong
security mechanisms that will prevent unauthorized users from
accessing sensitive data.
Fig. 3. Secure Storage – Protocol Overview
In the rest of this section we provide a high level description
of a protocol that was implemented for the needs of “Melior”
and provides mechanisms for securely storing and sharing
medical data in an e-health cloud platform.
Our protocol consists of a cloud platform (CP ), virtual
machines (VM ), a trusted third party (TTP ), a secure compo-
nent (SC) and domain managers (d). Furthermore, we assume
that basic functionality normally provided by a CP , such as
registration and authentication of a user, is available. Similar
to [18], domain managers can launch new VM instances,
which can in turn create data and securely share it with other
VM instances both within the same and other IaaS clouds.
The proposed protocol also relies on the principles of trusted
computing and capabilities of the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM ) [19].
For the needs of our protocol, we assume that the reader
is familiar with the concept of public cryptography and that
each party has generated a public/private key pair (pk/sk).
The private key is kept secret while the public key is shared
with the rest of the community. We assume that during the
initialization phase, each entity obtains a certificate via the
certification authority provided by the CP . These keys and
certificates will be used to protect internal message exchanges
and hence the communication between the parties assumed
to be secure. Finally, our protocol relies on pseudorandom
functions [20] to create symmetric keys, a major tool for the
design of shared key cryptography protocols.
Domain managers can create different categories of data.
Each category is referred to as a domain that contains encrypted
data. Additionally, domain managers are able to share this data
by giving access to the corresponding domains to certain VMs
in the cloud, as well as to other domain managers within the
same or other IaaS clouds.
Consider the following scenario. A domain manager di that
manages a set of n VM instances (VMi =
{
vmi1, . . . , vm
i
n
}
)
wishes to create a new domain Domik and share it with a
set VMki of VMs such that VM
k
i ⊆ VMi. To this end, di
first authenticates to the CP and requests the generation of
the domain Domik. With the request for the generation of
Domik, di also provides a list of VM instances belonging to the
set VMi that should have access to the specified domain, as
well as the respective access rights. Furthermore, di provides
a description of the data that Domik will store; we call this
description as the metadata (metaik) of Dom
i
k. Then, CP is
responsible for creating Domik. This is done by allocating the
corresponding disk space and by adding domain information in
the header of the volume – CP adds metaik and an XML file
that contains the list of the VMs that can access Domik along
with their privileges.
Once Domik has been generated, any VM from VM
k
i can
access the domain. Assume vmik ∈ VMki wishes to access
Domik. To do so, SC must retrieve from TTP the symmetric
key (Kik) that will be used to confidentiality protect data in
Domik. The domain manager operating vm
i
k sends a request
to CP in order to mount Domik to the virtual machine instance;
the call is forwarded to and processed by SC.
In the request, di sends a credential that proves that vmik has
access to Domik. SC extracts from the header of the domain
Domik the metadata and the list VM
k
i and sends it to the TTP
along with the unique identifier of vmik. More precisely, the
message is encrypted with the public key of TTP and is of the
form
〈
ETTP
(
metaik
)
, ETTP
(
VMki
)
, ETTP
(
vmik
)〉
. Upon
reception, TTP finds the id of the VM that requests access by
decrypting ETTP
(
vmik
)
. Then, decrypts the list with the VMs
that can access Domik and checks if vm
i
k exists. If so, TTP
needs to generate a symmetric key3 that will be used to encrypt
data in Domik. To create the encryption key K
i
k, generates a
random nonce rk and uses a pseudorandom function (PRF )
[20] to calculate the following:
Kik = PRF
(
metaik‖rk,KTTP
)
,
where metaik‖rk is respectively the concatenation of metadata
and the random generated nonce, and KTTP is a master key
that is only known to the TTP . After generating the symmetric
key for Domik, TTP encrypts it with the public key of TPM
and sends it to the SC. Upon reception, SC, is responsible
for forwarding it to the TPM . TPM , first checks if the state
of the vmik remains trusted. If so, it reveals K
i
k and SC uses
it as input to the disk encryption subsystem on the compute
host where vmik is running. The disk encryption subsystem
seamlessly decrypts the mounted volume hosting Domik. Next,
the volume containing Domik is mounted as a disk device on
vmik, with read-write or read-only rights, depending on the
permissions granted by the di.
Due to space limitations, we only described the case where a
domain manager shares data with virtual machines in the same
cloud. However, the protocol allows data sharing organizations
that run in different cloud providers. Such functionality can
be important in cases where a patient visits a hospital in a
different country and medical staff needs to access her medical
data to decide on the care plan for the patient. A prototype
of the described protocol was implemented as an extension of
Openstack, a popular cloud platform. For a detailed description
of the protocol, a security analysis as well as a description of
access rights management, we refer the reader to [18].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described aspects of prototyping the
migration of a proprietary EHR system called “Melior”, used by
the Region Ska˚ne in Sweden, to a fully virtualized IaaS cloud.
We have presented a list of security requirements relevant
for the deployment of “Melior” in an IaaS cloud. Next, we
described a novel attack vector characteristic for IaaS clouds,
namely vulnerabilities in the VM image management process
and proposed a VM image management process that addresses
VM image creation, management and decommissioning. Fi-
nally, we have presented the application of a storage protection
protocol to the cloud deployment of “Melior”. This storage
protection protocol improves the confidentiality and integrity
protection of the medical records without affecting data access
functionality from a user perspective.
The security risks and solution relevant to an EHR system
deployment in a IaaS cloud presented in this paper cover only
a fraction of the challenges facing a large-scale migration of
public e-health systems to IaaS clouds. We hope this contribu-
tion will encourage an exchange of best practices and lessons
learned in migrating public e-health systems to fully virtualized
IaaS cloud environments.
3All data in a single domain is protected with the same storage protection
master key, the domain key. This key is generated by the TTP and cannot
ever leave TTP ′s logical perimeter.
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